Summa Contra Gentiles, First Book (On God)

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Saint Thomas Aquinas 1924
English
  • I. IN WHAT CONSISTS THE OFFICE OF A WISE MAN (preceded by Translator's Preface)
  • II. THE AUTHOR'S INTENTION IN THIS WORK
  • III. IN WHAT WAY IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE KNOWN THE DIVINE TRUTH
  • IV. THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT DIVINE THINGS WHICH IS ATTAINABLE BY REASON IS FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MAN AS AN OBJECT OF BELIEF
  • V. THAT THOSE THINGS WHICH CANNOT BE INVESTIGATED REASON ARE FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MAN AS AN OBJECT OF FAITH
  • VI. THAT IT IS NOT A MARK OF LEVITY TO ASSENT TO THE THINGS THAT ARE OF FAITH, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE ABOVE REASON
  • VII. THAT THE TRUTH OF REASON IS NOT IN OPPOSITION TO THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH
  • VIII. IN WHAT RELATION HUMAN REASON STANDS TO THE TRUTH OF FAITH
  • IX. OF THE ORDER AND MODE OF PROCEDURE IN THIS WORK
  • X. OF THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO AVER THAT IT CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS A GOD, SINCE THIS IS SELF-EVIDENT
  • XI. REFUTATION OF THE FOREGOING OPINION AND SOLUTION OF THE AFORESAID ARGUMENTS
  • XII. OF THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD CANNOT BE PROVED, AND THAT IT IS HELD BY FAITH ALONE
  • XIII. ARGUMENTS IN PROOF OF GOD'S EXISTENCE
  • XIV. THAT IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IT IS NECESSARY TO PROCEED BY THE WAY OF REMOTION
  • XV. THAT GOD IS ETERNAL
  • XVI. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO PASSIVE POTENTIALITY
  • XVII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO MATTER
  • XVIII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO COMPOSITION
  • XIX. THAT IN GOD THERE IS NOTHING VIOLENT OR BESIDE NATURE
  • XX. THAT GOD IS NOT A BODY
  • XXI. THAT GOD IS HIS OWN ESSENCE
  • XXII. THAT IN GOD EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE ARE THE SAME
  • XXIII. THAT THERE IS NO ACCIDENT IN GOD
  • XXIV. THAT THE DIVINE BEING CANNOT BE SPECIFIED BY THE ADDITION OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE
  • XXV. THAT GOD IS NOT IN ANY GENUS
  • XXVI. THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORMAL BEING OF ALL THINGS
  • XXVII. THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORM OF A BODY
  • XXVIII. OF THE DIVINE PERFECTION
  • XXIX. OF THE LIKENESS OF CREATURES
  • XXX. WHAT TERMS CAN BE PREDICATED OF GOD
  • XXXI. THAT THE DIVINE PERFECTION AND THE PLURALITY OF DIVINE NAMES ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY
  • XXXII. THAT NOTHING IS PREDICATED UNIVOCALLY OF GOD AND OTHER THINGS
  • XXXIII. THAT NOT ALL TERMS APPLIED TO GOD AND CREATURES ARE PURELY EQUIVOCAL
  • XXXIV. THAT TERMS APPLIED TO GOD AND CREATURES ARE EMPLOYED ANALOGICALLY
  • XXXV. THAT THE SEVERAL NAMES PREDICATED OF GOD ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS
  • XXXVI. HOW OUR INTELLECT FORMS A PROPOSITION ABOUT GOD
  • XXXVII. THAT GOD IS GOOD
  • XXXVIII. THAT GOD IS GOODNESS ITSELF
  • XXXIX. THAT NO EVIL CAN BE IN GOD
  • XL. THAT GOD IS THE GOOD OF EVERY GOOD
  • XLI. THAT GOD IS THE SOVEREIGN GOOD
  • XLII. THAT GOD IS ONE
  • XLIII. THAT GOD IS INFINITE
  • XLIV. THAT GOD IS AN INTELLIGENT BEING
  • XLV. THAT GOD'S ACT OF INTELLIGENCE IS HIS ESSENCE
  • XLVI. THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS BY NOTHING ELSE THAN HIS ESSENCE
  • XLVII. THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF PERFECTLY
  • XLVIII. THAT GOD KNOWS ONLY HIMSELF FIRST AND PER SE
  • XLIX. THAT GOD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF
  • L. THAT GOD HAS PROPER KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS
  • LI. REASONS FOR INQUIRING HOW THERE IS A MULTITUDE OF THINGS UNDERSTOOD IN THE DIVINE INTELLECT
  • LII. REASONS FOR INQUIRING HOW THERE IS A MULTITUDE OF THINGS UNDERSTOOD IN THE DIVINE INTELLECT
  • LIII. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING DOUBT
  • LIV. HOW THE DIVINE ESSENCE, THOUGH ONE AND SIMPLE, IS A PROPER LIKENESS OF ALL THINGS INTELLIGIBLE
  • LV. THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS ALL THINGS AT THE SAME INSTANT
  • LVI. THAT GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT A HABIT
  • LVII. THAT GOD'S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT DISCURSIVE
  • LVIII. THAT GOD DOES NOT UNDERSTAND BY COMPOSITION AND DIVISION
  • LIX. THAT GOD IS NOT IGNORANT OF THE TRUTH OF ENUNCIATIONS
  • LX. THAT GOD IS TRUTH
  • LXI. THAT GOD IS THE MOST PURE TRUTH
  • LXII. THAT THE DIVINE TRUTH IS THE FIRST AND SUPREME TRUTH
  • LXIII. THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD DENY TO GOD THE KNOWLEDGE OF SINGULARS
  • LXIV. ORDER OF THE THINGS TO BE SAID ABOUT THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE
  • LXV. THAT GOD KNOWS SINGULARS
  • LXVI. THAT GOD KNOWS THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT
  • LXVII. THAT GOD KNOWS FUTURE CONTINGENT SINGULARS
  • LXVIII. THAT GOD KNOWS THE MOVEMENTS OF THE WILL
  • LXIX. THAT GOD KNOWS INFINITE THINGS
  • LXX. THAT GOD KNOWS TRIVIAL THINGS
  • LXXI. THAT GOD KNOWS EVIL THINGS
  • LXXII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS WILL
  • LXXIII. THAT GOD'S WILL IS HIS ESSENCE
  • LXXIV. THAT THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT OF GOD'S WILL IS THE DIVINE ESSENCE
  • LXXV. THAT GOD IN WILLING HIMSELF WILLS ALSO OTHER THINGS
  • LXXVI. THAT GOD, BY THE ONE ACT OF HIS WILL, WILLS HIMSELF AND OTHER THINGS
  • LXXVII. THAT THE MULTITUDE OF THINGS WILLED IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY
  • LXXVIII. THAT THE DIVINE WILL EXTENDS TO PARTICULAR GOODS
  • LXXIX. THAT GOD WILLS EVEN THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT YET
  • LXXX. THAT GOD NECESSARILY WILLS HIS BEING AND HIS GOODNESS
  • LXXXI. THAT GOD DOES NOT NECESSARILY WILL OTHER THINGS THAN HIMSELF
  • LXXXII. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE STATEMENT THAT GOD WILLS NOT OF NECESSITY THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF, IN THAT IT INVOLVES IMPOSSIBILITIES
  • LXXXIII. THAT GOD WILLS SOMETHING OTHER THAN HIMSELF BY A NECESSITY OF SUPPOSITION
  • LXXXIV. THAT GOD'S WILL IS NOT OF THINGS IMPOSSIBLE IN THEMSELVES
  • LXXXV. THAT THE DIVINE WILL DOES NOT REMOVE CONTINGENCY FROM THINGS, NOR IMPOSE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY ON THEM
  • LXXXVI. THAT A REASON OF THE DIVINE WILL CAN BE ASSIGNED
  • LXXXVII. THAT NOTHING CAN BE THE CAUSE OF THE DIVINE WILL
  • LXXXVIII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS FREE-WILL
  • LXXXIX. THAT THE PASSIONS OF THE APPETITE ARE NOT IN GOD
  • XC. THAT IN GOD ARE DELIGHT AND JOY, NOR ARE THEY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE DIVINE PERFECTION
  • XCI. THAT IN GOD THERE IS LOVE
  • XCII. HOW VIRTUES ARE TO BE ASCRIBED TO GOD
  • XCIII. THAT IN GOD THERE ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES WHICH ARE ABOUT ACTIONS
  • XCIV. THAT THE CONTEMPLATIVE VIRTUES ARE IN GOD
  • XCV. THAT GOD CANNOT WILL EVIL
  • XCVI. THAT GOD HATES NOTHING, NOR CAN THE HATRED OF ANYTHING BE ASCRIBED TO HIM
  • XCVII. THAT GOD IS A LIVING BEING
  • XCVIII. THAT GOD IS HIS OWN LIFE
  • XCIX. THAT GOD'S LIFE IS ETERNAL
  • C. THAT GOD IS HAPPY
  • CI. THAT GOD IS HIS OWN HAPPINESS
  • CII. THAT GOD'S HAPPINESS IS PERFECT AND SINGULAR, SURPASSING ALL OTHER HAPPINESS
The Summa Contra Gentiles was composed by Thomas Aquinas between 1259 and 1265, in four books broadly covering teachings on God, on Creation, on Providence, and on tenets specific to Christianity. This Summa is not to be confused with his final Summa, the Summa Theologiae. The latter is specifically "theological" and directed to a Christian audience (hence Summa "Theologica"), whereas the former, as the "Contra Gentiles" indicates, is directed toward "non-Christian" thinkers. Implicitly a defence of the Catholic Christian faith, the first three books constitute a sort of rational apology of Christian thought, where philosophical arguments are deployed to defend Christian beliefs and usually only evoke Scripture in a latter instance to show its concordance with these largely-rational conclusions; the fourth book, however, is theological in character given that its content deals primarily with topics derived from Christian revelation. Although Thomas Aquinas certainly aims to discredit pagan, Jewish, Muslim or Christian-"heretical" positions incompatible with the Catholic Christian religion in this work, at the same time he incorporates whatever is salvageable from their thought, thus often quoting in his favor the very authors he discredits on other positions: therefore the "Contra Gentiles" of this Summa is not to be understood as an outright rejection of non-Christian thought, but rather as a sort of "rational purification" unto its Catholic assimilation, in disposing open minds to revealed Christian truths. (Summary by M.S.C. Lambert, LC)

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