Summa Contra Gentiles, Second Book (On Creation)

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By Listen TheBook Posted on May 31, 2023

In Category - Christianity - Other, Christianity - Commentary

Authors: Saint Thomas Aquinas In Year : 1923

Book Language: English

Audiobook: Summa Contra Gentiles, Second Book (On Creation)

I. CONNECTION OF THE FOREGOING WITH THE SEQUEL
II. THAT THE CONSIDERATION OF CREATURES IS USEFUL FOR BUILDING UP OUR FAITH
III. THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF CREATURES AVAILS FOR REFUTING ERRORS AGAINST GOD
IV. THAT THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE THEOLOGIAN TREAT OF CREATURES IN DIFFERENT WAYS
V. ORDER OF THE THINGS TO BE SAID
VI. THAT IT BECOMES GOD TO BE THE SOURCE OF BEING TO OTHER THINGS
VII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS ACTIVE POWER
VIII. THAT GOD'S POWER IS HIS SUBSTANCE
IX. THAT GOD'S POWER IS HIS ACTION
X. IN WHAT WAY POWER IS ASCRIBED TO GOD
XI. THAT SOMETHING IS SAID OF GOD IN RELATION TO CREATURES
XII. THAT RELATIONS SAID OF GOD IN REFERENCE TO CREATURES ARE NOT REALLY IN GOD
XIII. HOW THE AFORESAID RELATIONS ARE PREDICATED OF GOD
XIV. HOW THE AFORESAID RELATIONS ARE PREDICATED OF GOD
XV. THAT GOD IS TO ALL THINGS THE CAUSE OF BEING
XVI. THAT GOD BROUGHT THINGS INTO BEING OUT OF NOTHING
XVII. THAT CREATION IS NEITHER MOVEMENT NOR CHANGE
XVIII. HOW TO SOLVE THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST CREATION
XIX. THAT IN CREATION THERE IS NO SUCCESSION
XX. THAT NO BODY CAN CREATE
XXI. THAT IT BELONGS TO GOD ALONE TO CREATE
XXII. THAT GOD CAN DO ALL THINGS
XXIII. THAT GOD DOES NOT ACT OF NATURAL NECESSITY
XXIV. THAT GOD WORKS ACCORDING TO HIS WISDOM
XXV. HOW THE ALMIGHTY IS SAID TO BE UNABLE TO DO CERTAIN THINGS
XXVI. THAT THE DIVINE INTELLECT IS NOT CONFINED TO CERTAIN DETERMINED EFFECTS
XXVII. THAT THE DIVINE WILL IS NOT CONFINED TO CERTAIN EFFECTS
XXVIII. HOW THERE IS ANYTHING DUE IN THE PRODUCTION OF THINGS
XXIX. HOW THERE IS ANYTHING DUE IN THE PRODUCTION OF THINGS
XXX. HOW THERE CAN BE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY IN CREATED THINGS
XXXI. THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR CREATURES TO HAVE BEEN ALWAYS
XXXII. ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WISH TO PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM GOD'S SIDE OF THE QUESTION
XXXIII. ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CREATURES
XXXIV. ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE MAKING
XXXV. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS, AND FIRST OF THOSE THAT WERE TAKEN FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GOD
XXXVI. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS PRODUCED ON THE PART OF THE THINGS MADE
XXXVII. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS TAKEN FROM THE MAKING OF THINGS
XXXVIII. ARGUMENTS BY WHICH SOME ENDEAVOUR TO PROVE THAT THE WORLD IS NOT ETERNAL
XXXIX. THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT FROM CHANCE
XL. THAT MATTER IS NOT THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS
XLI. THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT ON ACCOUNT OF A CONTRARIETY OF AGENTS
XLII. THAT THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT THE ORDER OF SECONDARY AGENTS
XLIII. THAT THE DISTINCTION AMONG THINGS DOES NOT RESULT FROM SOME SECONDARY AGENT INTRODUCING VARIOUS FORMS INTO MATTER
XLIV. THAT DISTINCTION AMONG THINGS DID NOT RESULT FROM THE DIVERSITY OF MERITS OR DEMERITS
XLV. WHAT IS IN TRUTH THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS
XLVI. THAT FOR THE PERFECTION OF THE UNIVERSE IT WAS NECESSARY THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME INTELLECTUAL CREATURES
XLVII. THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE CAPABLE OF WILLING
XLVIII. THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE OF FREE-WILL IN ACTING
XLIX. THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS NOT A BODY
L. THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE IMMATERIAL
LI. THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS NOT A MATERIAL FORM
LII. THAT IN CREATED INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING AND WHAT IS
LIII. THAT IN CREATED INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES THERE IS ACT AND POTENTIALITY
LIV. THAT COMPOSITION OF SUBSTANCE AND BEING IS NOT THE SAME AS COMPOSITION OF MATTER AND FORM
LV. THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE INCORRUPTIBLE
LVI. IN WHAT WAY IT IS POSSIBLE FOR AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE TO BE UNITED TO THE BODY
LVII. THE OPINION OF PLATO CONCERNING THE UNION OF THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL WITH THE BODY
LVIII. THAT THE NUTRITIVE, SENSITIVE, AND INTELLECTIVE FACULTIES IN MAN ARE NOT THREE SOULS
LIX. THAT MAN'S POSSIBLE INTELLECT IS NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE
LX. THAT MAN DERIVES HIS SPECIES NOT FROM THE PASSIVE, BUT FROM THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT
LXI. THAT THE AFORESAID OPINION IS CONTRARY TO THAT OF ARISTOTLE
LXII. AGAINST THE OPINION OF ALEXANDER ABOUT THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT
LXIII. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A TEMPERAMENT, AS GALEN ASSERTED
LXIV. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A HARMONY
LXV. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A BODY
LXVI. AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THAT INTELLECT AND SENSE ARE THE SAME
LXVII. AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT IS THE IMAGINATION
LXVIII. HOW AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE CAN BE THE FORM OF THE BODY
LXIX. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS BY WHICH IT WAS PROVED ABOVE THAT AN INTELLECTUAL SLBSTANCE CANNOT BE UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM
LXX. THAT ACCORDING TO THE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE WE JUST SAY THAT THE INTELLECT IS UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM
LXXI. THAT THE SOUL IS UNITED TO THE BODY IMMEDIATELY
LXXII. THAT THE WHOLE SOUL IS IN THE WHOLE BODY AND IN EACH PART THEREOF
LXXIII. THAT THERE IS NOT ONE POSSIBLE INTELLECT IN ALL MEN
LXXIV. OF THE OPINION OF AVICENNA, WHO ASSERTED THAT INTELLIGIBLE FORMS ARE NOT PRESERVED IN THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT
LXXV. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THE UNITY OF THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT
LXXVI. THAT THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IS NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE BUT PART OF THE SOUL
LXXVII. THAT IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE POSSIBLE AND ACTIVE INTELLECT TO CONCUR IN THE ONE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL
LXXVIII. THAT ARISTOTLE'S OPINION CONCERNING THE ACTIVE INTELLECT WAS NOT THAT IT IS A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE, BUT RATHER THAT IT IS PART OF THE SOUL
LXXIX. THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED
LXXX. ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT THE SOUL IS CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED
LXXXI. ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT THE SOUL IS CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED
LXXXII. THAT THE SOULS OF DUMB ANIMALS ARE NOT IMMORTAL
LXXXIII. THAT THE HUMAN SOUL BEGINS TO EXIST WITH THE BODY
LXXXIV. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS
LXXXV. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT MADE OF GOD'S SUBSTANCE
LXXXVI. THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT TRANSMITTED WITH THE SEMEN
LXXXVII. THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS BROUGHT INTO BEING THROUGH CREATION BY GOD
LXXXVIII. ARGUMENTS FOR PROVING THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS FORMED FROM THE SEMEN
LXXXIX. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS
XC. THAT AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS UNITED AS A FORM TO NO OTHER THAN THE HUMAN BODY
XCI. THAT THERE ARE SOME INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES WHICH ARE NOT UNITED TO BODIES
XCII. OF THE GREAT NUMBER OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES
XCIII. THAT THERE ARE NOT SEVERAL SEPARATE SUBSTANCES OF ONE SPECIES
XCIV. THAT THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCE AND THE SOUL ARE NOT OF ONE SPECIES
XCV. HOW WE ARE TO UNDERSTAND GENUS AND SPECIES IN SEPARATE SUBSTANCES
XCVI. THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO NOT GATHER THEIR KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSIBLES
XCVII. THAT THE INTELLECT OF A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE ALWAYS UNDERSTANDS ACTUALLY
XCVIII. HOW ONE SEPARATE SUBSTANCE UNDERSTANDS ANOTHER
XCIX. THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW MATERIAL THINGS
C. THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW SINGULARS
CI. WHETHER SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW ALL THINGS AT THE SAME TIME BY THEIR NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

The Summa Contra Gentiles was composed by Thomas Aquinas between 1259 and 1265, in four books broadly covering teachings on God, on Creation, on Providence, and on tenets specific to Christianity. This Summa is not to be confused with his final Summa, the Summa Theologiae. The latter is specifically "theological" and directed to a Christian audience (hence Summa "Theologica"), whereas the former, as the "Contra Gentiles" indicates, is directed toward "non-Christian" thinkers. Implicitly a defence of the Catholic Christian faith, the first three books constitute a sort of rational apology of Christian thought, where philosophical arguments are deployed to defend Christian beliefs and usually only evoke Scripture in a latter instance to show its concordance with these largely-rational conclusions; the fourth book, however, is theological in character given that its content deals primarily with topics derived from Christian revelation. Although Thomas Aquinas certainly aims to discredit pagan, Jewish, Muslim or Christian-"heretical" positions incompatible with the Catholic Christian religion in this work, at the same time he incorporates whatever is salvageable from their thought, thus often quoting in his favor the very authors he discredits on other positions: therefore the "Contra Gentiles" of this Summa is not to be understood as an outright rejection of non-Christian thought, but rather as a sort of "rational purification" unto its Catholic assimilation, in disposing open minds to revealed Christian truths. (Summary by M.S.C. Lambert, LC)